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Dear Sir,
India’s foreign policy was once a major anomaly of  the Cold 
War system. Widely understood as to be driven by Realpolitik, 
the newly independent nation’s foreign policy was deemed 
“immoral” by the United States and was met with sunken 
disbelief  by democratic countries more often than not, within 
Asia and the wider world. India for many decades, from 1947 
to Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s market-oriented reforms 
in 1991, was a highly regulated state capitalist economy. 
The country’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was 
a Fabian Socialist MP in Britain and was psychologically 
not very close to his own country; so much so that the title 
of  his most famous volume was to be “The Discovery of  
India” denoting, first of  all, his own personal discovery 
of  his native country. Subsequent Congress Party Prime 
Ministers and Foreign Ministers of  India, from Krishna 
Menon to Rajiv Gandhi (Nehru’s grandson through his 
mother PM India Gandhi – no relation to the Mahatma), 
based Indian foreign policy on a cosmopolitan understanding 
of  the Nehru Legacy: State led development at home, 
“nonalignment” abroad. A founding member of  the Non-
aligned Movement and the budding Afro-Asian solidarity of  
the late 1950s/1960s, India still opened up to the USSR early 
on, in 1955, when Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev and his 
premier Kosygin visited the country. By 1958, the two were 
trading arms. This corresponded with the anti-Mao shift 
in Soviet foreign policymaking from as early as 1958 when 
Moscow withdrew its advisors from Beijing. By the time of  
the 1962 Indian-Chinese border conflict, the Soviets were 
selling warplanes to India (to be used against their Communist 
comrades in China). India got so entangled with the USSR 
that in 1965, its conflict with Pakistan was resolved through 
negotiating in Soviet Tashkent. In 1969, when the USSR 
clashed with China in its own border skirmishes, India was 
firmly embedded in the Soviet orbit. When West Pakistan’s 
Army, in December 1971, started to bring genocide to East 
Pakistan, the latter allied itself  with India, and India sought 
refuge in signing a 20-year Treaty of  Peace, Friendship and 
Cooperation with the USSR. This was a military alliance in all 
but name between India, where most people were fervently 
attached to a plethora of  subcontinental religions, and the 
USSR, the officially atheist empire. Only the collapse of  the 
USSR put an end to this unacknowledged military alliance.
India’s leadership under the Congress Party shifted 
domestically toward the left (Coca Cola was banned, 
international banks nationalized), and the Indian cultural 
character of  the country’s foreign policy seemed to be 
entirely forgotten. PM Indira Gandhi, although she showed 
deference in a private capacity to gurus such as Sai Baba, 
avoided meticulously to change the internationalist, and 
indeed, socialist leanings that characterized her party’s foreign 
policy preferences.
All this changed with the Bharatiya Janata Party from the late 
1990s onward, culminating in the current administration. 
Overtures to the United States started already in the 
1990s. India detonated a nuclear device under the BJP’s 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee as Prime Minister, and the United 
States subsequently recognized India’s nuclear power 
status (without recognizing Pakistan’s). While Congress 
and the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty lost its Indian rootedness, 
the BJP masterminded and managed a massive transition 
from socialism/state capitalism to a capitalist economy, 
while representing Indian interests with new found 
vigor. Underpinning these was a newly resurgent Hindu 
cultural awakening. Whereas in the 1970s, India’s cultural 
values were more efficiently represented by pioneering 
organizations such as the Krishna-Bhakti movement 
ISKCON in the West than by the Indian state, this was to 
change in the 21st century. Under Prime Minister Modi, a 
new conservative waive emerged, one that guides India’s 
foreign policy initiatives, some of  which focus on bringing 
the benefits of  yoga to the world. This does not mean that 
Value-driven Foreign Policy in South Asia and its Lessons 
for the West Asian Region
Access this article online
DOI: 10.25079/ukhjss.v3n1y2019.pp83-84 E-ISSN: 2520-7806
Copyright © 2019 Lukács. Open Access journal with Creative 
Commons Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives License 4.0 
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). 
LETTER TO EDITOR
Letter to Editor
UKH Journal of Social Sciences | Volume 3 • Number 1 • 201984
India abandoned old allies such as Russia (it makes use of  
Russian military technology, or the GLONASS navigation 
system), but it appears globally as a power that is conscious 
of  its own history and values.
Possible implications for the West Asian region are manifold. 
Chief  among them is the notion that success is more often 
than not tied to standing up for one’s own values. In the 
context of  Kurdish interests, the peacebuilding mechanisms 
of  Naqshbandi Sufi Sheiks will be of  major value. Regionally 
rootless ideologies that have found ways to give false hopes 
in West Asia, such as belonging to cynics and atheist forces, 
are less efficient even in the practical sense. Certainly, such 
enlightened conservatism will help, in a situation where 
fundamentalisms threaten the peace, as today, North of  the 
Persian Gulf.
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